Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.
1
[T]he volume of information that people create themselves-the full range of communications from voice calls, e-mails and texts to uploaded pictures, video, and music-pales in comparison to the amount of digital information created about them each day. 
I. INTRODUCTION [1]
Predictive analytics use a method known as data mining to identify trends, patterns, or relationships among data, which can then be used to develop a predictive model; 3 in many cases attempting to predict behavior. The advent of ubiquitous monitoring and tracking-from self-generated content, web browsing, online transactions, geolocation tracking, and infrastructure sensors-provide the "big data" needed for data mining and predictive analytics. Privacy law has not kept up, particularly since most of the data are "public", in that they are not secret or confidential. Yet, big data mining can reveal intimate facts and portrayals of individuals.
[2]
After providing general background on data analytics, this article explores possible theories of privacy protection for predictive analytics; specifically under the evolving "mosaic" theory that has so far been considered, to varying degrees, in Fourth Amendment search scenarios. This article makes an argument that predictive analytics are ripe for privacy protection based on the mosaic theory. [3] This article then turns to predictive analytics in the workplace, exploring ways in which big data is used in the employment context and considering what level of privacy protection may be available to workers. The conclusion is not optimistic, from a privacy advocacy perspective, as workplace privacy was already minimized before big data even made its appearance. For all practical purposes, it is impossible to avoid "emitting" digital information that can be collected, stored, analyzed, and used for a myriad of decision scenarios; all one can really do is be aware that it is 5 [5]
But predictive analytics can go a step further than traditional data analysis-creating a picture of social behavior that was not previously possible.
10 Ericka Menchen-Trevino notes that a new interdisciplinary field, computational social science, is forming around the social analysis of digital imprints left by e-mail, text messages, tweets, surfing the web, social media applications, and smart phones.
11
These data are not necessarily tracking transactional records of atomized behavior-such as the purchasing history of customers-but are keeping track of communication dynamics and social interactions. 12 For computational social scientists, big data is "big" not because of its size, but because its analytical potential is qualitatively different. 13 Indeed, some researchers claim that big data can track human behavior more precisely than theoretical models.
14 Big data can help illuminate the complexity that 10 See 12 See González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 148. 13 See Menchen-Trevino, supra note 10, at 329. 14 See, e.g., González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 147-48 (discussing "end of theory" arguments); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 70 ("In the future, our understanding will be driven more by the abundance of data rather than by hypotheses."); Chris Anderson, interactions add to social dynamics "with an impressive level of detail."
15
[6] Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier provide a brief analysis of the promise-and the peril-of big data predictive analytics. Prior to big data, analytics relied on determining whether an individual was part of a group; for example, actuarial tables indicate that men over fifty years of age are more prone to colon cancer, so all men over fifty may pay more for health insurance. 16 In contrast, big data analysis is noncausal, identifying individuals-rather than groups-from a vast array of data. 17 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier argue that, on the plus side, this makes profiling much more accurate, less discriminatory, and more individualized. 18 For example, rather than identifying an individual as a terrorist threat due to his or her nationality or religion, additional data points such as body language and other physiological patterns can be analyzed to make a more accurate determination of a possible threat. 19 On the down side, it may lead some to predict behavior based on mere http://perma.cc/Z4UD-6X4L (claiming that "faced with massive data, this approach to science-hypothesize, model, test-is becoming obsolete"). "We can throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot." Id.
15 González-Bailón, supra note 11, at 148. 16 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 5, at 160. 17 See id. 18 See id. at 161. 19 probabilities; big data analytics can only "predict that for a specific individual, a particular future behavior has a certain probability." 20 [7] Predictive analytics are not perfect. While they may reveal hidden correlations, there may be no causation. For example, Google engineers found a correlation between Google flu-related searches and outbreaks of the flu, identifying flu outbreaks before the Centers for Disease Control. 21 However, the engineers did not examine what caused those searches. For example, a few years later, Google's predictive capabilities came into question when it drastically overestimated peak flu levels based on search queries, most likely because Google's algorithms did not sufficiently take into consideration people who were not suffering from the flu conducting flu-related searches due to higher than usual press coverage of a flu outbreak.
22 "Imputing true causality in big data is a research field in its infancy." 23 In addition, while there may be a lot of data, they are not always complete or accurate and may contain outliers-all of which can lower the performance of data mining algorithms.
24

III. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND PRIVACY
[8]
In 26 See id. at 19-20 (discussing the practice of bed-sharing primarily due to the lack of beds and for warmth). 27 See, e.g., STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY 1908 -1921 , at 124-26 (1981 ; see also Samuel M. Levin, Ford Profit Sharing, 1914 -1920 , 6 PERSONNEL J. 75, 78 (1927 . 28 See SMITH, supra note 25, at 76; see also Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L. Q. 101, 104-05 (1968) (asserting that, particularly as a result of the Louisiana Purchase, "the solitary isolation of the explorers, the pioneers, and the settlers of the West was so absolute that privacy was assured by the very physical dimensions which circumscribed the frontier").
9
from the house-tops. '" 31 The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a change in society fueled by technological advancements, including the instant camera, 32 which itself helped fuel a profusion of newspapers and magazines satisfying an insatiable demand for gossip and intimate portrayals. 33 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 196 ("The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle."); see also Mensel, supra note 32, at 25 (arguing that "amateur photographers played an important role in provoking outrage among editorial commentators, judges, and legislators which eventually helped lead to the recognition of the right to privacy"). 
10
life are digitally recorded, stored, and analyzed-the collection of information about us is ubiquitous. 35 Today, because of social media, mobile devices, surveillance devices, and networked sensors, individuals constantly emit information-whether they know it or not-that can be used or misused in a variety of ways.
36
[11] Most of the information we "emit" is digital-such as e-mail and text messages, mouse clicks and keystrokes, phone numbers dialed and calls received, and GPS location data-which can suffer from overcollection and data fusion. "Over-collection occurs when an engineering design intentionally, and sometimes clandestinely, collects information 35 See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at ix ("The ubiquity of computing and electronic communication technologies has led to the exponential growth of data from both digital and analog sources."); see also 40 See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 21. 41 Id.
12
[12] This is one way in which predictive analytics contribute to online tracking. 42 One does not even have to shop online to be targeted by predictive analytics. Perhaps the most famous-and chilling-example comes from Target Corporation's use of analytics to predict its shoppers' future buying habits. Target-like all other retailers-understands that many consumers' buying habits are ingrained and difficult to change. 43 But, one particular moment when buying habits can change significantly is the birth of a child. Most marketers are reactive, and send coupons and advertisements after the birth of the child based on public birth records. Target sought to be proactive-predicting when shoppers, based on buying habits, 44 44 See id. Whenever possible, Target assigns each shopper a unique code that tracks every purchase and which is linked to individual demographic information, such as age, marriage status, neighborhood, estimated salary, credit cards used, and Web sites visited.
See id.
Target can buy data about your ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read, if you've ever declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you bought (or lost) your house, where you went to college, what kinds of topics you talk about online, whether you prefer certain brands of coffee, paper towels, cereal or applesauce, your political leanings, reading habits, charitable giving and the number of cars you own. Id.
13
good it informed a father of his daughter's pregnancy before he even knew about it. 46 As the Target incident illustrates, predictive analytics can create a risk of revealing intimate personal information before it becomes publicly available, 47 even when the original data is non-personally identifiable.
48 45 See id. Rather than be among the multiple marketers sending materials post-birth, Target wanted to target (pun intended) women in their second trimester, which is when most expectant mothers begin buying all new and different items, such as prenatal vitamins and maternity clothing. See id. 46 See Duhigg, supra note 43 (relating how an irate father complained to Target that it was encouraging his teenage daughter to get pregnant by sending her coupons for maternity and baby clothes and cribs, only to find out later that his daughter was indeed pregnant). But see Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014, 11:38 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TwAfkZFe, archived at http://perma.cc/2JAW-ZFTK (arguing that pregnant women receive pregnancy-related coupons because everyone on Target's mailing list receives such coupons; suggesting further that Target mixes pregnancyrelated coupons with other unrelated coupons not to avoid upsetting pregnant women who would receive only pregnancy-related coupons but because the coupons will be sent to women who are not pregnant); cf. Jessica Goldstein, Meet the Woman Who Did Everything in Her Power to Hide Her Pregnancy from Big Data, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2014/04/29/3432050/can-you-hidefrom-big-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/R7Q7-KEQJ (reporting on the efforts of Jane Vertesi, Princeton University Assistant Professor of Sociology, to prevent "big data" from finding out she was pregnant, and who found hiding from "big data" extremely inconvenient and expensive, besides nearly impossible). 47 See BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS, supra note 4, at 2 ("[T]he power of analytics, rich data stores and the insights they can yield raise risks to privacy."); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 8, at 253-54 ("It is one thing to recommend for a customer books, music or movies she might be interested in based on her previous purchases; it is quite another thing to identify when she is pregnant before her closest family knows."). Application of analytics to big data does not conform well to traditional legal approaches because big data does not result from one-on-one interaction between the data controller and the individual. Big data instead pulls in information from disparate sources. Its value derives not only from its volume, but also from its varied and expansive scope-big data brings together an enormous pool of information that initially may seem unrelated.
49
A. The Public/Private Dichotomy and the Third-Party Doctrine
[13] The principal privacy conundrum posed by predictive analytics is that data mining relies to a large extent on "public" information-it derives from transactions and social interactions that are often generally observable. "A matter that is already public or that has previously become part of the public domain is not private." 50 While total secrecy is not required-information disclosed to a few people may remain private 51 -if even only a few people actually see the information, privacy can be lost if the potential audience is large. 15 boundary between public and private "the fundamental, first-principles question in privacy law." 54 This public/private dichotomy is reflected in a number of court decisions: "objects, activities, or statements that [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'";
55 "whatever the public may see from a public place cannot be private"; 56 and watching an appellee and videotaping his activities while he was outside his home, in his front yard, where he was exposed to public view was not an actionable invasion of privacy.
57 Indeed, one court has gone so far as to hold there was no reasonable expectation of privacy where a woman was recorded by a secretly installed camera while changing clothes in an office area, despite locking the door, because others had a key to the office and could have walked in at any moment.
58
[14] Closely related to the public/private dichotomy is the so-called "third-party doctrine," which provides that private information disclosed to a third party can lose its privacy protection. enshroud the entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment protection." 64 However, the Supreme Court may ultimately recognize that modern technology may finally impose a limit on the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
65
[17] The third-party doctrine has been applied in common law privacy cases as well. For example, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed a plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim against her employer in relation to restricted-access Facebook posts because a person allowed to view those posts had provided them to her employer. 66 In to recognize a right of privacy in Facebook posts viewed by a friend-of-afriend.
67
[18] Big data and its associated predictive analytics extend the privacy concern beyond discrete events and transactions-a concern perhaps best described by a fictional professor describing his forthcoming book 
20
In light of ever-developing technologies that provide ubiquitous tracking and data collection, perhaps, as Justice Sotomayor intimated, it is time to reexamine the public/private dichotomy and third-party doctrine. This reexamination is currently taking place in Fourth Amendment cases and can easily be applied to common law privacy. Unlike personal data that reside in explicit records in databases, information acquired about persons via data mining is often derived from implicit patterns in the data. The patterns can suggest "new" facts, relationships, or associations about a person, placing that person in a "newly discovered" category or group. Also, because most personal data collected and used in data mining applications is considered neither confidential nor intimate in nature, there is a tendency to presume that such data must by default be public data. And unlike the personal data that are often exchanged between or across two or more databases in traditional database retrieval processes, in the data mining process personal data are often manipulated within a single database, and typically within a large data warehouse. Court affirmed Maynard, it did not do so under the mosaic theory-it instead held that the agents needed a warrant because they physically trespassed when they placed the GPS on the suspect's car. 75 However, in his concurrence with the judgment, Justice Alito expressly stated that he would "analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the longterm monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove." 76 Justice Alito suggested that the majority's "reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor"-the attaching to the bottom of a car the GPS device itself. 77 And as noted earlier, Justice Sotomayor expressed her opinion "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties." 75 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 950 n.3 ("Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area . . . a search [requiring a warrant] has undoubtedly occurred."). Indeed, the majority openly skirted what many commentators and Court observers considered to be the key issue in the case: "It may be that achieving the same result [i.e., continuous surveillance for a 4-week period] through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question." Id. at 954. 76 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 77 Id. at 961. Justice Alito noted that the basis for the Court's holding in Jones would be inapplicable once all cars were fitted with GPS devices. See id. 78 See supra text accompanying note 65.
23
[21] One can also perhaps glean some insight into the Supreme Court's concern over Fourth Amendment privacy and evolving technology in Riley v. California, in which the Court held that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. 79 As a general matter, police officers do not need a warrant to search a person and the immediately surrounding area incident to an arrest in order to secure the officers' safety and prevent the destruction evidence. 80 In Riley, the Supreme Court concluded that neither risk exists when the search is of digital data. 81 Ultimately, "when 'privacy-related concerns are weighty enough' a 'search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.'"
82
[22] Importantly, at least for the arguments made in this article, Justice Robert's opinion recognizes that collected data can be different: 83 The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information-an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video-that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. 81 See id. at 2484-85. 82 Id. at 2488 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 Ct. , 1979 Ct. (2013 ). 83 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person.").
The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.
84
[23] Analogous to ubiquitous monitoring, Chief Justice Roberts additionally noted the pervasiveness of data collected through cell phones: "Today . . . it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the intimate." 85 Chief Justice Roberts noted also the qualitative difference in stored data (in this case, on a cell phone):
An Internet search and browsing history . . . could reveal an individual's private interests or concerns . . . . Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information . . . can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building. 
25
[24] Based on Riley's discussion of the expanding quantitative and qualitative aspects of stored data, it is logical to surmise that if the Supreme Court had addressed the substantive privacy issues in Jones, it very likely might have adopted the mosaic theory-particularly in light of Justice Alito's and Justice Sotomayor's concurrences. 87 One distinguishing factor in "mosaic" cases is the length of surveillance. "[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."
88
Indeed this was one of Justice Scalia's objections to applying the theory-"it remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is 'surely' too long." 89 This may be an issue within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but it should not be in the context of private-party data tracking and analysis-it is now ubiquitous and fundamentally unavoidable.
[25] Within the context of private-party data tracking and analysis, the mosaic theory is less about length than extremity. New York courts in particular have recognized a common law privacy invasion resulting from overly zealous surveillance of "public" conduct. 90 For example, in Nader v. General Motors Corporation, in which General Motors had hired 87 Cf. Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and The Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 701 (Dec. 2014) (concluding that while cases such as Jones and Riley "suggest that the Court is aware that modern surveillance technologies represent a problem for traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, but is still casting about for a solution that might prove workable in the context of data mining."). 88 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("For… [most] offenses, society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period."). 89 Id. at 954. 90 See generally Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (discussing how surveillance in public places may be so "overzealous" that it could be rendered as actionable).
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private investigators to follow Ralph Nader, a critic of General Motors, and interview his acquaintances, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that surveillance of public activities could rise to the level of an invasion of privacy.
91 "[I]t is manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy. But, under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so 'overzealous' as to render it actionable." 92 Judge Breitel elaborated: "Although acts performed in 'public', especially if taken singly or in small numbers, may not be confidential, at least arguably a right to privacy may nevertheless be invaded through extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing of acts normally disconnected and anonymous." 93 Similarly, in Galella v. Onassis, a photographer who had stalked former First Lady Jacqueline Onassis to such an extent that he could comment "at considerable length on her personality, her shopping tastes and habits, and her preferences for entertainment," had invaded Onassis's privacy.
94
[26] The Supreme Court has expanded the concept that some public information can be private. Recognizing that "both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of 91 Id. at 770-71 (applying District of Columbia law). 92 Id. (citing Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that allegations that insurer had detective agency constantly shadow woman after she filed personal injury action against the insurer in a manner calculated to frighten her and give her neighbors the impression that she was engaged in some wrongful activity were sufficient for a claim of invasion of privacy)). 93 Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 772 (Breitel, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (noting that the New York Court of Appeals did rule, though, that the investigators' interviewing Mr. Nader's acquaintances did not violate his privacy and that "[i]nformation about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff"). Recognizing that complete computerized dossiers are now available at one's fingertips, 97 Justice Stevens concluded that the Freedom of Information Act's exemptions from disclosure recognize "the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that outstrips the combined power of the bits of information contained within." Experience has shown that it is possible, but it's really not easy, and it comes with a lot of sacrifices. And it requires some technical skill. So to that end, it's my concern about the opt-out idea. I don't actually think it's feasible for everyone to do this. I don't think that's the answer. I don't think that's the simple answer to the big data problem: that you can just turn this stuff off, that you cannot do the things that you clearly need to do for your daily life. But I really want to emphasize, I did this [avoiding tracking] as an experiment to see what it would take, to see what these systems were demanding of us that we'd forgotten about, and how it is that they worked. And so I don't expect people to do this. In fact, I wouldn't recommend it.
101
[28] No one should be forced into the experimental "dilemma" attempted by Professor Vertesi of completely rejecting all aspects of modern life-from social communications to shopping-to avoid constant commercial surveillance. 102 But in the workplace, we have even less control over the degree of monitoring that is taking place.
also supra text accompanying notes 79-86 (discussing the holding of Riley). In Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., plaintiffs sought to view the contents of the cell phones of ten Safety Marking employees, seeking evidence of racially offensive text messages and images. Bakhit, 2014 LEXIS 86761 at *3-4. Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons denied (without prejudice) the plaintiff's discovery request based, in part, on Riley, to protect the individual employees' privacy interests in the contents of their cell phones. See id. at *9-10
IV. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN THE WORKPLACE
[29] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Frederick Taylor and his scientific management techniques sought to obtain maximum efficiency in industrial work-the one best way.
103 Under Taylor's methodology, the principal tools of measurement and observation were the manager with a stopwatch. 104 To the workers, the stopwatch "was a hideous invasion of privacy, an oppressive all-seeing eye that peered into their work lives, ripping at their dignity." With the coming of the networked computer with monitoring software attached, industrial regimes of quantification, targeting, and control now pervade the white-collar world: how many patients, litigants, customers with complaints, students with theses, and future home owners with mortgage applications have been processed or billed per day or week, and how many should be processed or billed, because the digital white-collar line is subject to speedup no less than its factory counterpart? 
A. Predictive Analytics: Surveillance on Steroids?
[31] One commentator from Frederick Taylor's era suggested that any system that schedules every movement so that a worker "is simply one of the gears in the operation of the machine" would not secure the best results in the long run. 107 Adding big data and analytics to the mix may only compound the problems:
Big Data also holds out the promise of, for instance, total supervision in the workplace. Lest perfect surveillance of employees sound alarming, this new field is given the blandly technocratic name of "workforce science". Every phone call, email and even mouse-click of an employee can be stored and analysed to guide management in making decisions.
So "workforce science" is a scaled-up and automated version of the "scientific management" promoted by Frederick Winslow Taylor in his highly influential 1911 book, The Principles of Scientific Management, which recounted how he performed time-and-motion studies on labourers in order to get more work out of them. It has since been alleged that Winslow fiddled the data, but that didn't stop him becoming an eponym: "taylorisation" is the breaking-down of some activity into discrete repetitive units, supposedly to improve efficiency. Big Data promises taylorisation on steroids. 
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[32] Fundamentally, the "predictive" in predictive analytics is to predict human behavior. 109 It can be used, for example, in predicting whether someone has all the skills and resources for a particular job opening.
110
Companies believe they can learn more about a potential employee by scouring the Internet compared to just reading a résumé.
111 Résumés are not considered to be data intensive; instead Internet searches may reveal hints at implicit activity never mentioned in a résumé, such as active participation in relevant online forums or e-mail chat lists.
112 LinkedIn, the popular professional social media site, generates more than half its revenue from selling its data to recruiters. 113 On the flip side, predictive analytics can also be used to decide whether to dismiss an employee.
114
[33] At present, workplace predictive analytics focus primarily on collecting real-time data to improve productivity under the theory that the more a company knows about its employees the more it can understand their job performance.
115 "You have to bring the same rigor you bring to 32 operations and finance to the analysis of people." 116 One study of "121 million anonymous performance and behavioral records from . . . a company that provides workforce management information to companies through the use of big data" found the following: only fifty percent of hourly workers will remain with an employer for more than one year; employees who use Chrome or Firefox web browsers instead of Microsoft's Internet Explorer "stay at their jobs longer, miss fifteen percent fewer work days, and deliver higher customer satisfaction;" and "[e]mployees who use three to four social networks are more likely to perform better in their jobs than those who are less involved with social networks."
117 "An employee retention program developed by software company SAS, for example, crunches data on employees who have quit in the past five years-their skills, profiles, studies, and friendships. Then it finds current employees with similar patterns. Another SAS program pinpoints the workers most likely to suffer accidents." 118 Stephen Burks et al. combined personnel data from nine large firms in three industries (callcenters, trucking, and high-tech) that spanned hundreds of thousands of workers and millions of applicants and concluded in part that, while referred applicants have similar skills to non-referred applicants, referred 
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applicants are most likely to be hired. 119 Marjorie Laura Kane-Sellers applied predictive analytics to fourteen years of sales force retention data of a Fortune 500 company and concluded "training and development participation contributes more significantly to employee retention than salary and job title promotions to the firm's ability to retain sales professionals." 120 And IBM analysts are reportedly charting the skills and experience of IBM's entire workforce in an effort to predict skills that will be needed in the future. 121 [34] In a slightly different approach, Ben Waber analyzed career outcomes at three U.S. companies using sensor ID badges that monitor physical movement and detect conversations and speech patterns using a combination of infrared, Bluetooth, and microphone data. 122 In addition to the sensor data, the researchers also looked at e-mail, instant message, and phone call data. 123 Waber's results focused on workplace performance versus limited career growth for women: at a banking call center women were measured as more productive than men, but women were disadvantaged when it came to winning promotions and reaching the 34 upper echelons of management; at a pharmaceutical company, women were fractionally more likely to be promoted than men based on the researchers' model, " [ 126 See WABER, supra note 10, at 73 (arguing eating lunch with work colleagues is more productive than eating alone at one's desk). 127 Id. at 180.
128 Lohr, supra note 125. 129 See, e.g., Waber, supra note 122 (noting that while examining speech patterns in conversations, researchers "ignored the actual content of conversations to protect privacy").
anonymous data do not necessarily remain anonymous when combined with other data, 130 and non-substantive data (such as phone call numbers dialed, websites visited, e-mail metadata) can reveal just as much personal and private information as the contents of communications themselves.
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B. Predictive Analytics and Discrimination
[37] Recall the study mentioned earlier indicating that employees who use Chrome or Firefox web browsers instead of Microsoft's Internet Explorer stay at their jobs longer, miss fifteen percent fewer work days, and deliver higher customer satisfaction. 132 Could this finding prove to be self-fulfilling? In other words, perhaps management begins treating employees using Internet Explorer differently-assuming they are less productive anyway and will probably quit soon-leading to dissatisfaction by those employees, lower productivity, and eventual dismissal. Or perhaps the employer begins using this criterion (use of Internet Explorer) as a hiring factor. However, what if an employee or job applicant uses Internet Explorer because it provides accessibility options that better accommodate the employee's disability? Is the employer discriminating on the basis of disability?
[38] Federal law prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 133 and Congress have recognized that discrimination can be more subtleresulting from selection criteria that unintentionally but significantly negatively impacts a protected class. As a result of the Supreme Court's holding that Title VII requires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification," 139 Congress amended Title VII to expressly proscribe unintentional (i.e., disparate impact) discrimination. 140 The Supreme Court has also recognized that disparate impact claims apply under the Americans with Disabilities Act 141 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
142
[39] While arguments have been made that big data is objective, raw data is immune to social bias, and mass-level analysis will avoid groupbased discrimination, big data is actually used to segregate individuals into groups. 143 Using big data for employment-related selection criteria can employment."). All states have parallel laws that prohibit at least Title VII and disability, often with broader definitions of protected classes.
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potentially "reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision-makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society." 144 Data mining may reflect the quintessential unintentional discrimination, as the adverse selection criteria "may be an artifact of the data mining process itself, rather than a result of programmers assigning certain factors inappropriate weight." 145 Simply not having a LinkedIn profile or the ability to maintain a sophisticated electronic presence may disadvantage certain protected classes. 146 
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[45] The FCRA does not prevent employers from using background information to vet job applicants and employees; 168 it merely requires certain disclosures 169 and restricts a limited set of information that can be reported. 170 The FCRA also only applies when an employer uses a "consumer reporting agency" 171 to compile the consumer report; as such, it will not apply to larger employers-such as SAS or IBM-that perform their own internal job-related predictive analytics.
172
[46] The FCRA could provide a foundation for limiting the use of predictive analytics in the workplace. The "mosaic" theory instructs us that using predictive analytics is not necessarily "fair game" just because the underlying data are derived from publicly available information or information in the hands of third parties. A theoretical framework therefore exists to argue that predictive analytics using data mined from 43 big data deserve some regulation. At a minimum, notice should be provided to job applicants and employees if adverse decisions are based on analytics. 173 More importantly, since predictive analytics rely more on behavioral and social data-unlike "traditional" consumer reports that are based on discrete fact-based transactions that can be challenged for accuracy-employers should have the burden to establish causation, not just correlation. The mosaic theory can also add a layer of restriction by ensuring that big data profiles created for job applicants or employees do not extend beyond what society and individuals would reasonably expect; that they do not result in an intimate portrait greater than the sum of their parts. 174 In short, every aspect of individuals' digital lives should not be collected and analyzed by employers without restrictions on reasonableness and accuracy (of predictions, not of the underlying data).
[47] Proponents of predictive analytics may argue that such restrictions could stifle progress and potentially prevent employers from using valuable tools that could boost productivity. However, cause and effect must be balanced. Predictive analytics are unproven and subject to error. 175 In the meantime, individuals' livelihoods may be adversely affected. Should we allow individuals to be denied a job, denied a promotion, or even fired, just because of a random correlation based on behavioral information employees had no idea their employers had access to?
V. CONCLUSION
[48] Workforce predictive analytics go beyond mere workplace monitoring. Employers are not just monitoring call length, how many boxes a worker can pack in an hour, or whether a worker is "cyberloafing" by watching cat videos instead of processing invoices. By analyzing social media communications, personal interaction data, even with whom one eats lunch, employers are attempting to build profiles going well beyond the mechanics of work and that can potentially reveal more about a worker than he or she knows about him or herself. The same concerns raised by proponents of the mosaic theory and critiques of data agglomeration apply equally-if not more 176 -to workplace analytics.
[49] The threat to worker privacy is real, so tradeoffs will have to be considered, beginning with data collection standards. Unfortunately, most calls for standards relate to general Internet tracking, are fairly amorphous, 177 and are not workplace-specific. The World Economic Forum has at least made one fairly concrete suggestion, though still related to commercial tracking: govern the usage of data rather than the data themselves. 178 Meanwhile, Ian Kerr and Jessica Earle conclude that "[b]ig data enables a universalizable strategy of preemptive social decision-making [that] renders individuals unable to observe, understand, participate in, or respond to information gathered or assumptions made about them;" in other words, "big data can be used to make important decisions that implicate us without our even knowing it."
179 As such, they argue for a reexamination of privacy and due process values-"namely, that there is wisdom in setting boundaries around the kinds of assumptions that can and cannot be made about people." 180 This supports this article's earlier call for disclosure whenever predictive analytics are used in an adverse employment decision and placing the burden on the employer to show causation, not just correlation in the analytics' conclusions.
